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The comparative study of criminal procedure, developed over
generations of comparison between national justice systems, has
become expert in applying a dichotomy. On one side of this
dichotomy, a theorized adversarial tradition privileges principles
of individual autonomy; on the other, a theorized inquisitorial
model envisions a judicially directed quest for truth.' For decades,
these paradigms have occupied comparativists with determining
whether national systems embody the characteristics and outcomes
that the two models of criminal procedure predict.2
The emergence of the ad hoc and permanent international
criminal tribunals in the past twenty years has challenged the
utility of this typology. With the establishment of the permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court), commentators
rushed to apply the adversarial/inquisitorial typology to these new
t B.Sc. (McGill), B.S.W. (McGill), LL.B. (McGill), B.C.L. (McGill), M.S.W. (McGill),
LL.M. (Harv.), S.J.D. Candidate (Harv.), Assistant Professor, Florida International
University College of Law. The author was an independent expert delegate on the
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression and a former law clerk to ICC
Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo. He would like to thank Megan Fairlie, Alana Klein,
and Frdddric Mdgret for their input. Thanks to Julie Lockhead for her research and
Marisol Floren for her assistance at the law library.
1t J.D./ L.L.M., expected May 2011, Duke University School of Law; B.A., Columbia
University. Law Clerk, The Honorable Rosemary Barkett, United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (2011-12).
1 SARAH J. SUMMERS, FAIR TRIALS: THE EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL
TRADITION AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2007).
2 For a survey of this literature, see id. at 3-20.
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subjects. But as the ICC continues to mature in its practices, it
provokes discussion on whether the comfortable framework of
adversarial and inquisitorial systems should be used to evaluate an
institution that exists in a fundamentally different context from
that of national criminal justice systems. The descriptive function
that this typology was generated to serve may have been
superseded in the context of the international criminal tribunals. If
it has, the problem currently facing international criminal justice is
not to describe its institutions in relation to the logic of the
common or civil law, though the common and civil law remain
important repositories of wisdom and experience. Rather, the
project remains at the first-phase question of deciding what rules
of procedure are best suited to the unique context in which an
international criminal tribunal operates.
. Unfortunately, just as it is difficult for comparative criminal
law scholars to put aside the familiar adversarial/inquisitorial
classifications,' the challenge of confining to their proper place the
3See, e.g., Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: "Adversarial,"
Inquisitorial" or Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 1, 5 (2003) ("Today there is general
agreement that the procedure before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and ICC is a mixed one in that it contains structural elements or
building blocks of both the 'adversarial' and the 'inquisitorial' system."); Mireille
Delmas-Marty, The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Conception of
International Criminal Law, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 13, 18 (2003) (arguing that
comparative study is necessary to the process of hybridizing accusatorial and
inquisitorial systems in international criminal procedure); Claus Kress, The Procedural
Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise,
1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 603, 604-05 (2003) (identifying unique features of ICC procedure
in light of the "famous common law-civil law divide on criminal procedure"). See
generally Alphons Orie, Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International
Criminal Proceedings Prior to the Establishment of the ICC and in the Proceedings
Before the ICC, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1439 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002)
(outlining central features of the accusatorial/inquisitorial typology and applying the
typology to the procedures of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),
ICTY, and ICC).
4 Cf Mirjan R. Damagka, What is the Point ofInternational Criminal Justice?, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 329, 331-39 (2008) (urging a reconsideration of the purposes of
international criminal justice as a whole as opposed to the normative assumptions
underlying its rules of procedure in particular).
5 See SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 5-9 (observing that even authors who
acknowledge the limited utility of the adversarial/inquisitorial typology are nevertheless
unable to avoid using it); see also Chrisje Brants & Stewart Field, Legal Cultures,
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normative assumptions underpinning those classifications is harder
still. In order to avoid entangling the ICC in rules that are not
tailored to fit its specific goals and institutional context, the
normative purposes underlying procedural rules derived from
domestic institutions should be reexamined. Where these
premises do not match the specific situation of international
tribunals, they and the rules based upon them should be discarded
and replaced with new, deliberately defined premises and rules
that owe their origins not to national systems, but to the
dynamically evolving context of international criminal tribunals.
To introduce the following articles, this discussion draws out
basic principles that may be of use in reexamining the reasoning
behind the rules of procedure in international criminal law. It then
considers how the articles presented on the subsequent pages
reflect or depart from trends in current scholarship that attempt to
apply the methods of comparative law to a study of international
criminal procedure. Drawing support from several innovative and
promising approaches in the recent literature, it concludes by
urging comparative scholars to redirect their focus from describing
the procedural features of the emerging international system to
engaging with the more fundamental question of what those
features ought to be.
I. Distinguishing Reasoning From Its Premises
Chief among the normative premises that are often used to
define rules of procedure is the principle that the rights of the
defense must be the starting point in any just procedural system.6
The scholarly tendency to theorize procedural rules as a bulwark
against prosecutorial power flows from the origins of European
and Anglo-American criminal procedure in struggles between the
Political Cultures and Procedural Traditions: Towards a Comparative Interpretation of
Covert and Proactive Policing in England and Wales and the Netherlands, in
CONTRASTING CRIMINAL JUSTICE: GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE 77, 78-79 (David
Nelken ed., 2000) (describing difficulties encountered in applying the
adversarial/inquisitorial typology to research in the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands).
6 See, e.g., SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 61 ("Defence rights are inevitably
associated with 'fairness' and, more often than not, with conceptions of individual
responsibility and autonomy.").
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individual and the state.' Given that these rules originated in the
balance between governmental interests-represented by the
prosecutor-and the individual interests of the accused, some
jurists regard them as irreducible in domestic justice systems.
The conscience of the international justice movement is troubled
by the possibility that transplanting domestically developed
procedural norms into international criminal law may frustrate the
prosecution of international crimes.9  With the creation of a
permanent forum for prosecuting international crimes in the
International Criminal Court, an opportunity to advance the values
of human rights is mingled with the threat of their betrayal.o To
escape the danger that the Court's mission will become corrupted
by illegitimate means, supporters of the Court may conclude that
intemational criminal procedure must concentrate on assuring the
7 See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
106-77 (2003) (describing the evolution of the right to defense counsel in Anglo-
American law in the Treason Trials Act of 1696); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL
LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND
LATIN AMERICA 124-32 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the impact of the works of Cesare
Beccaria and others on Continental European criminal procedure); SUMMERS, supra note
1, at 61-94 (describing the crystallization of a coherent theory of rights of the defense in
nineteenth-century Continental Europe).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 928 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (protesting the majority's construction of the rule excluding unlawfully
obtained evidence as constitutionally dispensable).
9 Gary Bass explains this anxiety in his description of what he refers to as "War
Crimes Legalism." GARY i. BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 20-36 (2000). His discussion captures the tension between the
desire to punish the perpetrators of grave crimes and the restraints imposed by liberal
procedural conventions such as "due process." As a result of this tension, Bass observes,
"[1]iberal diplomats often find themselves squirming at the challenge of exporting their
domestic standards." Id. at 29; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Between Impunity and
Show Trials, in 6 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAw 32-35 (Jochen A.
Frowein & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2002), available at
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/koskenniemi_6.pdf, Jeremy Peterson,
Unpacking Show Trials: Situating the Trial ofSaddam Hussein, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 257,
282-84 (2007).
10 Concerns about this possibility became acute when the prosecutor was accused
of withholding exculpatory evidence in the ICC's case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo.
See generally Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery Before the International
Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 223-26
(2009) (analyzing the Court's impasse over the prosecutor's disclosure obligations).
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rights of the accused as its foremost objective."
Whether the logic that supports this conclusion in the national
context applies to international tribunals is hardly immune from
doubt. 12  Strict application of procedural norms developed in
national contexts may represent a kind of syllogistic error, leading
its proponents to draw flawed conclusions from faulty premises.
The articles that appear in the following pages can be viewed as
attempts by sophisticated thinkers familiar with the logic of the
common and civil law traditions to reckon with this problem.
Among the contributing authors, Professor Mirjan Damaika
questions whether the project of global justice may prove too
heavy a burden for international tribunals if they are hampered by
the full range of procedural rules that benefit the defense.13 This
inquiry encounters the possibility that procedural configurations
normally applied in domestic criminal justice systems must be
reconfigured to address the differences found in the international
environment. Damagka nevertheless insists that a correct
conception of the ICC's mission is not in tension with prioritizing
the procedural rights of the accused over other objectives of
international criminal procedure.14 According to Damaika, the
success of the ICC depends upon the extent to which it is
perceived as fair, which in turn is measured according to its
treatment of defendants.15
Other works in this volume reflect the assumption that
11 The protection of the rights of the accused in international proceedings is often
equated with strict enforcement of the procedural dimensions of human rights. E.g.,
CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 46-48
(2001) ("If human rights are to be protected via criminal prosecution, the applied system
must itself be strictly compatible with human rights.").
12 In an insightful discussion of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights, Sarah J. Summers observes a similar failure to consider how the contexts in
which prosecutions are undertaken may be relevant to deciding whether procedural rules
should be accorded the status of irreducible rights. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at 172-78.
13 Mirjan Damagka, The Competing Visions of Fairness: The Basic Choice for
International Criminal Tribunals, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 366 (2011) ("Is it not
likely, however, that the heavy burden of their demanding tasks-coupled with their
frustrating indigenous weaknesses-places these standards under greater stress than is
the case in the environment of domestic criminal prosecutions?").
14 Id. at 9-10.
15 Id. at 10 (rejecting depictions of fairness that embrace parties other than the
defense).
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international criminal procedure should embody a concept of
fairness that largely transposes the premises underlying domestic
procedural standards into the international context. Professor
Michele Caianiello warns that by combining a party-driven system
of discovery with disclosure rules that tailor more closely to an
inquisitorial design, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court'6  works a flawed combination that structurally
disadvantages the defense." Going beyond the traditional concept
of hearsay rules as a means of ensuring the reliability of
evidence,s Professor Caianiello examines how prohibitions on
hearsay evidence partially correct what he identifies as an
imbalance of arms between defense and prosecution.19 Implicit in
his criticism is the traditional sensitivity for the impact of
procedure on the rights of the defense. This heightened sensitivity
creates a proclivity toward scrutinizing procedural rules out of
concern for the defendant's interests.20
Professor Mosteller's comparison of the structural
determinants of prosecutorial decisions leads him to propose
reconfiguring prosecutors' offices to provide what he regards as
necessary protections for defendants. Whereas Professor
Caianiello reflects on threats embodied in a single phase of an ICC
proceeding, Professor Mosteller perceives a pervasive danger in
the structure of one of the world's most powerful criminal justice
institutions-the office of the American prosecutor.2 1 According
to Professor Mosteller, the structural configuration of prosecutors'
16 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/10 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
17 See Michele Caianiello, Law ofEvidence at the International Criminal Court:
Blending Accusatorial and Inquisitorial Models, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 287,
287-88 (2011).
18 See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 337 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002)
(explaining that the primary purpose of the hearsay rule is to preserve the reliability of
evidence).
19 See Caianiello, supra note 17, at 294 (arguing that the hearsay rules are "strictly .
linked to the equality of arms principle").
20 Cf Damaika, supra note 13, at 375 (noting that "the strain between the interests
of victims and defendants is usually observed from the defendant's perspective").
21 See Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect
the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative
Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 319, at Section II.A (discussing the scope of
American prosecutors' defacto power).
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offices exacerbates cognitive biases that deemphasize the
exculpatory value of evidence.2 2 To mitigate this biasing effect,
Mosteller suggests borrowing ideas from inquisitorial systems that
apportion prosecutorial functions among several judicial officials
rather than entrusting a single officer with the authority to select
cases for prosecution and prove them at trial. Professor Mosteller
concludes that inquisitorial systems offer better means of limiting
the harmful biases that otherwise may afflict prosecutors'
decisions. Thus, he registers his analysis as a point in favor of an
inquisitorial model on "some figurative scorer's card." 23 Why that
scorecard is drawn to measure criminal procedure by how well it
preserves the interests of the defense remains to be considered.
Deputy Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda declines to analyze
international criminal procedure in terms of its relation to national
models, perceiving in the ICC something unique.24 Rather than
borrowing whole-cloth from any national system, writes
Bensouda, the Court has assimilated national examples so
completely that its practice is, in effect, sui generis. Bensouda's
observations from her vantage point as Deputy Prosecutor portray
the maturation of the Court's practice in the areas of victim
participation and witness proofing. These examples depict a Court
that is cognizant of the need to adapt its practices to its exceptional
context and offer insight into the development of the Court's
procedures. If the process of elaboration and adaptation in the
ICC's rules of procedure continues along the pathway that
Bensouda traces, no attempt to explain or justify the Court's
practices will succeed without accounting for the context in which
these practices have developed.
Professor Damagka, responding to the flexibility of
international criminal procedural rules that Fatou Bensouda
describes, discerns that the broad aspirations and structural
features of international criminal justice threaten the procedural
guarantees that are central to liberal notions of a fair trial.2 5
Noting the inherent weakness of a judicial body that is not
22 Id. at Section II.C.
23 Id. at 354.
24 Fatou Bensouda, The ICC Statute - An Insider's Perspective on a Sui Generis
System for Global Justice, 36 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 277 (2011).
25 Damaika, supra note 13, at Section VII.
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integrated with any state apparatus, Professor Damagka
recommends that the ICC jettison some of its ambitions in order to
maintain domestically derived standards of fair procedure.26
Concluding that the educative role of the ICC is its most important
function and that notions of fair trial derived from domestic
traditions are indispensable to fulfill this aspect of the Court's
mission,2 7 Professor Damaika provokes an important question:
recognizing the ICC's unique institutional context demands
confronting whether notions of fair trial, due process, and
procedural rights as they were developed in national contexts are
relevant in the same way in the global arena.
II. Reconsidering the Premises
Beyond the technical arguments over disclosure rules, witness
preparation, and the appropriate scope of judicial intervention
looms the more basic problem of defining a normative basis for
international criminal procedure. Although scholarship over
several decades has proposed various procedural models as best
fitting international tribunals, the establishment of the ICC
requires a renewed effort to understand and choose deliberately
among the normative assumptions underlying the various models
of procedure.
One possible understanding of international criminal
procedure would adopt the premises underlying adversarial
adjudication. The procedures of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the
basis of much of contemporary international criminal law and
process, were predominantly adversarial,28 so this is a natural place
from which to begin the analysis. Since standards of criminal
procedure have evolved in the fifty years since the Nazi leaders
were tried by the Allies, it is inappropriate to compare
26 Id. at Section V.
27 See id. at 377-78 (discussing the importance of "procedural fairness" in
international criminal procedure).
28 Antonio Cassese, President, Int'l Tribunal for Crimes in former Yugo.,
Statements by the President Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions,
Summary of the Rules of Procedure at the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, (1) United Nations Document IT/29 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 2
vIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHART, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 650 (1995).
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contemporary international criminal procedure to the procedures
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. Rather,
scholars who choose to adopt the procedural rules of adversarial
systems as their model look to the procedures of the ad hoc
tribunals established by the UN Security Council after the
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the massacres in Rwanda
to determine whether these accorded with the highest standards of
due process expected of adversarial systems.29  The authors
employing this methodology are often American, so it is not
surprising that the most sophisticated analyses of this type employ
the due process framework of the U.S. legal system as a standard.
Other scholars, noting that the rules of the ad hoc tribunals
were a negotiated compromise between the proponents of common
and civil law procedures,30 seek to evaluate the procedures of the
tribunals with the values of both traditions in mind. These authors
write of the logic of adversarial and inquisitorial systems, which
map the common and civil law traditions respectively.3 1 The
challenge that arises within this methodology is deriving an
evaluative framework that is persuasive to jurists from both
traditions. In the context of specific examples from the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals or the ICC, one approach is
to comment upon the way that the procedures have affected the
rights of the accused.3 2 The sanctity of the rights of the accused is
29 See generally Megan A. Fairlie, Due Process Erosion: The Diminution of Live
Testimony at the ICTY 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 47 (2003) (discussing procedural delays of
the ICTY); Paul Hoffman, The Dusan Tadic Trial and Due Process Issues, 19 WHITTIER
L. REv. 313 (1997) (discussing due process issues deficiencies of ICTY proceedings);
Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. Il l
(1998) (questioning the safeguards of the rights of the accused in ICTY proceedings);
Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent with Due Process,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1997) (criticizing the use of unnamed witnesses in ICTY
proceedings); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of
Unnamed Witnesses Against Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996); Joanna Pozen,
Justice Obscured: The Non-Disclosure of Witnesses' Identities in ICTR Trials, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281 (2005-06) (criticizing the ICTR's decision to follow the
ICTY, and use unnamed witnesses).
30 See, e.g., Kress, supra note 3, at 605 (noting that the ad hoc tribunals were a
combination of inquisitorial and adversarial systems).
31 See, e.g., id (discussing the ways in which ICC judges have borrowed from both
systems and discussing why).
32 For an excellent example of this branch of scholarship, see Caianiello's
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a shared element of both liberal traditions, so this is a natural
evaluative benchmark." A key weakness of this methodology is
that the protections afforded to the accused in both systems are
quite different, so an overarching normative framework (or
agreement on the purpose of the specific rules of procedure) is
necessary to encompass them both. The challenge these scholars
face is to find a persuasive framework.
Some scholars, such as Salvatore Zappala, seek this
overarching framework in the universal precepts of human rights
law.34 According to Zappala, "human rights law is the ideal lens
for investigating the structures and functioning of international
criminal justice."" Zappala reasons that human rights law
"provides one of the best interpretative tools for the analysis of the
procedural mechanisms of international criminal justice, since it
helps identify the proper balances between the rights of
individuals and the interests of society."36 Frederick M6gret,
however, suggests several problems with international human
rights as an overarching framework from which to evaluate and
shape international criminal procedure. In essence, M6gret argues
that "international human rights will in most cases be under-
determinative of the issues at stake."37 In short, "international
human rights law has no formal status before international
criminal tribunals";3 8 it lacks the technical, ritual, and institutional
"thickness" of domestic traditions; 39 and when contradicting
contribution to this issue, Law of Evidence at ICC, supra note 17; see also Robert
Mosteller, Failures of the American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and
Conceptual Advantages of the Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, supra note
21. See also the early piece by Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of Common and
Continental Law at the ICTY and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L.
REv. 243 (2004) (assessing the combination of the two systems in the ICTY's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence).
33 See Caianiello, supra note 17; Fairlie, supra note 32, Mosteller, supra note 21.
34 SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 1 (Ian Brownlie & Vaughan Lowe eds., 2003).
35 Id
36 Id
37 Friddric Mgret, Beyond "Fairness": Understanding the Determinants of
International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 51 (2009).
38 Id at 52.
39 Id. at 53.
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procedural imperatives arise, such as the right to a speedy trial and
the necessity for rigorous rules of disclosure, human rights law
offers "few'definitive answers."4 0 Citing Colin Warbrick, M6gret
demonstrates that, "human rights standards 'provide a mere
skeleton of what is required."' 4 1
Scholars searching for an overarching framework from which
to evaluate and shape international criminal procedure, but who
are less wedded to human rights as that model, sometimes look to
42general notions of fairness. A number of these scholars,
acknowledging that fairness is not just about the defendant, make
use of the concept of "equality of arms."43 As Caianiello remarks,
however, equality of arms is not an independent and objective
standard: "[e]quality of arms represents a specific rigid principle
of the accusatorial model, which is conceived and shaped mainly
as a dispute among two litigants."4 4 Other authors, such as
Christine Chinkin45 and Mercedeh Momeni46 look beyond the
40 Id. at 55. Furthermore, when it comes to criminal procedure, human rights law is
minimalist in that it is meant to prevent the worst abuses rather than constitute an ideal
framework. Nor does it adequately mediate between different stakeholders who claim
rights, such as the defense and the victims. Finally, human rights law does not
satisfactorily specify the breadth of limitation clauses, that allow for derogation from
certain rights under particular contingencies, such as emergencies. See id. at 53-58.
41 Id. at 58 (quoting Colin Warbrick, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial,
3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 45, 50 (1998)).
42 Mdgret equates the scholarship on fairness with the scholarship on the rights of
the accused. Mdgret, supra note 37, at 38.
43 Airey v. Ireland, App. No. 6289173, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 305 (1979); Steel v.
United Kingdom, 2005-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2005); United States v. Tucker, 249 F.R.D. 58
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops, The Dichotomy between Judicial
Economy and Equality of Arms within International and Internationalized Criminal
Trials: A Defense Perspective, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1566, 1567-70 (2005); Gabrielle
McIntyre, Equality of Arms - Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 269
(2003); Stefania Negri, The Principle of "Equality of Arms" and the Evolving Law of
International Criminal Procedure, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 513 (2005); Jay Sterling Silver,
Equality ofArms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional Right, 1990 Wis. L.
REv. 1007 (1990); Miranda Sissons & Ari S. Bassin, Was the Dujail Trial Fair?, 5 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 272, 280 (2007).
44 Caianiello, supra note 17, at 293.
45 Christine M. Chinkin, Due Process and Witness Anonymity, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.
75, 75 (1997) ("I would argue that he [Monroe Leigh] has failed to take into account the
full details of the chamber's judgment, which recognized in particular that the accused's
right to know and confront prosecution witnesses is not absolute but may have to be
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rights of the accused in the discussion of fairness and include
additional stakeholders in the calculus, in particular, victims and
witnesses. Chinkin, for example, argues for the fairness of the
1995 pretrial ruling of the Tadic Court where the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held that it was
appropriate to indefinitely withhold the identities of certain
victims and witnesses from the accused and his counsel.4 7 In this
decision, the court opted to balance the rights of the accused with
the interests of these other stakeholders.48 Damagka, for his part,
is skeptical of a concept of procedural fairness that is overly
ambitious and, in particular, overly inclusive of stakeholders
beyond the defendant. Referring to victims of international crime,
he writes: "[i]t is true that their exalted position in international
criminal tribunals is now celebrated on ideological grounds as a
remarkable achievement, but the pragmatic wisdom of this
apotheosis is far from clear."49 Damagka's logic is that a key
function of international criminal tribunals is socio-pedagogic,so
that the most significant audience is communities sympathetic to
the accused, and therefore, that the best way that the tribunal will
serve its function is through meticulous care of his or her
procedural rights.'
Another branch of scholarship seeks to discover an evaluative
balanced against other important interests.").
46 Mercedeh Momeni, Note, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused
Against a Mandate to Protect Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity
Rules of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 41 How. L. J.
155 (1997).
47 See Chinkin, supra note 45, at 75-79.
48 See Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, [ 27, 55 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Aug. 10, 1995).
49 Damalka, supra note 13, at 376.
50 Id. ("They should aspire first and foremost to be moral teachers, and accord
pride of place to the socio-pedagogic function that is so often mentioned among the goals
of international criminal justice.").
51 Id. at 379 ("Victimized communities don't need condemnatory judgments to
provoke revulsion to international crimes in their midst. It is communities sympathetic
to the defendant that need to be stirred toward this sentiment: they should be the target of
moral messages. And unless the carriers of these messages are perceived as being fair to
the defendant, messages are likely to fall on deaf ears.").
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framework "beyond 'fairness."' 5 2 This scholarship probes the very
purposes of international criminal justice for a normative
framework that can be used to evaluate and shape the
jurisprudence on international criminal procedure. The reasoning
behind this methodology is that something more than the pure
logic of the adversarial or inquisitorial systems, or even notions of
fairness, is necessary as a basis for international criminal
procedure. Two authors who stand out for their sophistication
employing this methodology are Jens David Ohlin" and Frederick
Mgret.54
Ohlin, moving past the common law versus civil law
framework, proposes a "meta-theory of international criminal
procedure" from which to evaluate the jurisprudence of the ICC.
According to Ohlin, international criminal procedure should
advance certain instrumental goals derived from the very purposes
of international criminal justice.56 In particular, Ohlin
acknowledges that international criminal procedure should
separate the culpable from the non-culpable, ensure due process
protections, help find the historical truth and facilitate structured
victim participation.5 7 Ohlin's key contribution, however, is to
propose that international criminal procedure is not only about
vindicating these instrumental goals, but that international criminal
procedure also has an important intrinsic value: vindicating the
rule of law in contexts overtaken by anarchy."
It makes intuitive sense that the purposes of international
criminal procedure should be derivable from the purposes of
international criminal justice. Mgret, as part of a larger scholarly
project to develop what he calls "a global jurisprudence of the
specificity of international criminal justice,"5 9 begins to search for
a distinct "international procedural identity" from which to
52 Mgret, supra note 37, at 38-39.
53 Jens David Ohlin, A Meta-Theory of International Criminal Procedure:
Vindicating the Rule ofLaw, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2009).
54 Mgret, supra note 37, at 37.
55 Ohlin, supra note 53, at 82-83.
56 Id. at 83.
57 Id. at 90-99.
58 Id. at 103.
59 Mgret, supra note 37, at 42, n.12.
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evaluate the legitimacy of the emerging international procedural
rules.60 M6gret, like Ohlin, is sympathetic to the agenda of
"clearly articulating the goals of international criminal trials and
then shaping the methods to fit." 6' He is ultimately advocating for
international criminal procedure "uniquely suited to the reality and
the values of the tribunals' international nature while
simultaneously drawing from domestic traditions and seeking to
respect the right to a fair trial."6 2  Like Bensouda, Mgret and
Ohlin consider the international criminal justice system to be its
own tradition, sui generis.6 3  gret's contribution is to more fully
describe the quality of this sui generis system and make use of this
understanding in concrete ways.64
The limitation of Mgret's method can be found in his critique
of the approaches of those scholars using the international human
rights framework to evaluate and shape international criminal
procedure. Mgret's criticism of human rights as an evaluative
framework is that it will, in most cases, be under-determinative.6 5
Until the distinct "international procedural identity" that M6gret
seeks becomes more fully crystallized-perhaps through his own
efforts66-it will, like the human rights framework, "provide a
mere skeleton of what is required." 67  Another source of
60 Id. at 58-59.
61 Dermot M. Groome, Re-Evaluating the Theoretical Basis and Methodology of
International Criminal Trials, 25 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 791, 798 (2006); see also
Damaika, supra note 4, at 330 (urging a reconsideration of the purposes of international
criminal justice as a whole as opposed to the normative assumptions underlying its rules
of procedure in particular).
62 Mgret, supra note 37, at 59.
63 Bensouda, supra note 24; Mgret, supra note 37, at 40; Ohlin, supra note 53, at
77.
64 Mgret, supra note 37, at 40.
65 Id. at 41-42.
66 See Frederic Mgret, In Defense of Hybridity: Towards a Representational
Theory of International Criminal Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 725, 727-28 (2005);
Frederic Mgret, A Special Tribunal for Lebanon: The UN Security Council and the
Emancipation of International Criminal Justice, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 485, 486 (2008);
Frederic Migret, In Search of the 'Vertical': An Exploration of What Makes
International Criminal Tribunals Different (And Why), in FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 182 (Larissavan den Herik & Carsten Stahn eds.,
2010).
67 Mgret, supra note 37.
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indeterminacy, one that M6gret does not mention in his critique,
arises when deducing concrete conclusions from general premises,
such as the identity of international criminal procedure or its
purposes. The basic insight of legal realism is relevant here. A
person who is proficient at reasoning can begin from a premise of
the sort M6gret proposes-"[t]he legitimacy of international
criminal procedure also recommends that the tribunals operate
under a system of rules not entirely tilted toward one tradition at
the expense of another" 6'-and come to different answers to
specific procedural challenges. This is assuming, of course, that
one agrees with the international procedural identity as M6gret
describes it in the first place. Ohlin's project, of deducing
practical consequences from his insight that a key purpose of
international criminal procedure, is to vindicate the rule of law in
procedural vacuums is vulnerable to a similar critique.69
It is safe to conclude that no dominant paradigm from which
to evaluate the procedural jurisprudence of international tribunals
has yet emerged. As a result, the question of which procedures are
best and why remains a live one for scholars and, even more
significantly, for the ICC judges.
III. Toward New Norms
The procedural pedigree of the ICC is now well established:
the norms evolved predominantly out of common and civil law
traditions.70 But to what extent these transplanted rules should
carry the interpretative principles that give them meaning in the
generative national traditions remains at issue. If Bensouda is
right that the ICC has developed its rules of procedure to the point
where they are better understood as sui generis, commentators
should no longer be content with a simple compare-and-contrast of
the common and civil law fossils that can be excavated from the
ICC's current practices. Instead, the analysis should transition
from describing characteristics to choosing among various
purposes that procedural rules may serve. The most promising
place to start is to recognize, as the contributors to this issue have
68 Id. at 68.
69 See Ohlin, supra note 53, at 111-16 (discussing the practical consequences of the
rule of law concept).
70 Id. at 80-82.
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begun to do, the unique context in which the ICC operates to
fulfill its mandate. This is a reasonable point from which to
interrogate familiar assumptions, drawn from national contexts,
about the normative purposes of international criminal procedure.
Perhaps the key distinguishing feature between international
criminal justice and domestic criminal justice is that power at the
global level is disaggregated. A strong common or civil law state
aspires toward a monopoly on the legitimate (and effective) use of
force within its territory, and most come close. At the global
level, however, no such analog exists. States are, at least formally,
sovereign and equal under international law, which gives them
power and responsibility within an allotted space. No unregulated
space remains for the ICC. This has important repercussions on
the Court as it labors to fulfill its mandate to end impunity and
deter crimes that states are unwilling, or unable, to prevent or
punish.7 1 The challenges are even more daunting when political
and military leaders themselves have mobilized the state apparatus
toward the commission of massive crimes and other states are
complicit.72
One repercussion is that evidence collection is far more
challenging for the ICC than for an American or a French
prosecutor.7' Damaika is attuned to this difficulty and points it out
in his contribution to this publication. His response, however, is to
conclude that it will be tempting for international tribunals to relax
their rules of evidence in order to secure convictions, and that this
risks jeopardizing the rights of the defense. 74 However, might it
not be sensible, instead of increasing the procedural hurdles for the
ICC prosecutor, to craft rules of evidence that take account of his
or her compromised position when it comes to evidence
collection? These rules can protect the defendant's rights, but
71 Rome Statute, supra note 16, pmbl.
72 See generally SAMANTHA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA AND THE
AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002) (discussing the refusal of the U.S. government to recognize
and react to incidents of genocide throughout the twentieth century).
73 Damaika, supra note 13, at 367-68.
74 Id. at 366 ("Does this far from fanciful scenario not suggest that it is harder for
international than for domestic criminal judges to reject anonymous testimony, or to
exclude the fruits of technically illegal searches? Does it not suggest that international
judges might be more tempted than their national counterparts to depart sub silentio from
the postulated standard of proof sufficiency?").
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without overreaching and attempting to protect every individual
within ICC jurisdiction from the exercise of arbitrary state power.
This may be a central concern of domestic judicial institutions,
where the state is powerful within a territory and the police are
tempted to overreach, but it is not the ICC's job to police the
police. Procedural rules sensitive to the context, in which the ICC
operates, would prioritize the truth-finding function of criminal
justice, while excluding evidence obtained in an unconscionable
manner, such as by torture or fraud.
Chinkin identifies another repercussion of the ICC's lack of a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force within its territory:
"unlike many domestic jurisdictions confronting the issue of
witness security, the Tribunal cannot operate an effective
protection program that extends across national boundaries to the
many places that witnesses are now located."" Chinkin is
referring to the ICTY, established by the U.N. Security Council
under its Chapter VII enforcement powers. Antonio Cassese, the
Court's president, famously likened the ICTY to a giant with no
arms and no legs." The ICC, however, operating in ongoing
conflicts and regularly with no Security Council mandate, is even
less equipped to offer credible protection to the vast number of
victims and witnesses under its jurisdiction. The Victims and
Witnesses Unit does what it can, but expectations of its capacity
need to be constantly managed." The rules of evidence and
procedure at the ICC should be tailored to protect the safety of
victims and witnesses, while still inviting the defendant to
vigorously challenge the case. Technology can help, allowing the
defendant to challenge a vulnerable witness without being able to
identify that witness. Ultimately, it may be unreasonable to expect
7 Chinkin, supra note 45, at 76.
76 Antonio Cassese, On Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and
Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 13
(1998) ("[T]he ICTY remains very much like a giant without arms and legs-it needs
artificial limbs to walk and work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the
cooperation of states is not forthcoming, the ICTY cannot fulfill its functions. It has no
means at its disposal to force states to cooperate with it.").
77 See ICC, Summary Report on the Round Table on the Protection of Victims and
Witnesses Appearing Before the International Criminal Court (2009), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/19869519-923D-4F67-A61F-
35F78E424C68/280579/Report ENG.pdf.
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in the international context that every defendant will have the right
to know the identity of every prosecutorial witness.
Another repercussion of the ICC's lack of a monopoly on
legitimate force is that it is, at this point, devilishly hard to arrest
suspects." The outstanding arrest warrant for Sudanese President
Omar al Bashir is the most conspicuous example, but even the
leaders of the Lord's Resistance Army, depleted and marginalized,
are still at large.79 Because the ICC has no police force, it relies on
the cooperation of states to enforce its warrants. States, for their
part, are historically reticent to risk their soldiers to arrest
perpetrators of mass violence abroad." This is an area where the
ICC's rules of procedure could be tailored to the global context as
well. The abduction of Adolf Eichmann from Argentina by the
Israeli government may not have been a model of international
cooperation and rule of law, but there are other ways to facilitate
arrests." One way is through cooperation agreements where states
parties invite the assistance of other states parties to arrest suspects
within their territory. Another is for states to invite non-state
volunteers to assist, so long as they follow certain procedural
standards that safeguard the rights of the accused. This is akin to a
citizen's arrest, but could be more circumscribed in various ways.
For instance, this could be circumscribed by requiring the
permission and oversight of domestic law enforcement officials, if
not their direct participation. The larger point is that in a criminal
justice system lacking a state with a monopoly on the legitimate
use of force, the procedural rules should be tailored to the context
rather than unremittingly ratcheted up.
Another contextual element that should be considered when
shaping procedural rules is that it is often state authorities
committing the crimes. Not only are political, judicial, and
78 See Goran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal
Court, 25 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 605, 650-52 (2003).
79 Press Release, ICC, The ICC President Addresses the United Nations General
Assembly: "The ICC has Continued its Progress on Many Fronts," ICC-CPI-20101028-
PR591 (Oct. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.rcicl.orglenglish/list-more.asp?infoid=1227&classid-43.
80 BASS, supra note 9, at 29-30.
81 NEAL BASCOMB, HUNTING EICHMANN: HOW A BAND OF SURVIVORS AND A
YOUNG Spy AGENCY CHASED DOWN THE WORLD'S MOST NOTORIOUS NAzI 225-29
(2009).
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military officials unwilling or unable to prevent the crimes or
punish the perpetrators, they are actively involved in orchestrating
atrocities or covering them up. Here, domestic procedural rules
meant to prevent the arbitrary exercise of state power against
marginalized individuals in strong common or civil law states are
beside the point. The priority should be to encourage diplomatic
cooperation to stop the crimes and arrest the perpetrators so that
the atrocities do not resume. Reliable evidence provided by
cooperative intelligence services or international organizations
should be admissible, even if it would not necessarily be in the
domestic court of a properly functioning common or civil law
state.82
IV. Conclusion
Based on these observations, it is possible to conclude that a
new normative theory of international criminal procedure should
focus on the absence of a state apparatus accompanying
international tribunals. This threshold observation would
distinguish the foundational premise of the domestic procedural
configurations from which international procedure is derived,
namely, that procedure must act as an expression of and a restraint
upon the power of a state.8 3 When the relevance of this premise is
appropriately qualified in light of the unique features of the
international context, the opportunity emerges to replace it with a
normative principle that more accurately reflects that context and,
therefore, contributes more effectively to the success of the
institutions operating within it.
One such normative approach would seek to maximize the
capacity of the ICC to punish the crimes within its jurisdiction,
while minimizing the extent to which the Court's procedural rules
create doubts about the factual accuracy of the evidence used to
obtain convictions. This approach would ground efforts to
determine the elements of a just and functional procedural regime
82 As long as that evidence was not obtained by unscrupulous means such as
torture.
83 See generally MIRJAN R. DAMARKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE
AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 71-96 (1986)
(classifying legal processes in terms of the nature of governmental interference in
society).
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by rejecting appeals to indeterminate conceptions of fairness in
favor of an analysis that prioritizes the integrity of the facts
introduced at trial.
With this normative precept in mind, certain principles for
developing a new hierarchy of procedural rights begin to emerge.
Whereas domestic procedure is freighted with the task of enabling
judicial institutions to act as a check on a state apparatus, the ICC
need observe only those rules of procedure that mitigate the
possibility that the evidence used to obtain a conviction is actually
insufficient to establish the defendant's guilt and that evidence
collected in particularly egregious ways, like torture or fraud, is
excluded. Procedural rules that are oriented toward ensuring the
reliability of the evidence adduced at trial, therefore, would remain
integral, but those that function primarily to limit police power
could be interpreted to reflect the context in which the ICC
operates. Conceived differently, procedural rules created to
safeguard the liberty of the individual as a defendant must be
maintained, but those created to protect the liberty of the
community in general might be interpreted more flexibly by the
Court in light of its unique position and mandate. The ICC
governs no community of free individuals that it has the power to
oppress.
Any attempt to articulate the normative foundations of the
procedural rules applied by international tribunals will require
elaboration, and the lack of settled premises place even the most
promising efforts on thin ice. For the project of theorizing
international criminal procedure to keep pace with the increasingly
rapid evolution of its subject, it must investigate whether the
premises on which the prevailing methodologies of comparative
scholarship are based serve the goals of the analysis. The moment
may have arrived for the study of international criminal law to try
to discover the unifying purposes served by rules that, in the past,
it was content with merely describing. Failure to do so would
undervalue the extent to which the context of international
criminal tribunals differs from that of domestic institutions. A key
starting point is to evaluate the implications of the absence of a
state apparatus in the context of international criminal tribunals.
Once the implications of this difference from domestic institutions
are better understood, it is possible to construct a procedural
system that advances the unique goals of international justice by
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drawing on the wisdom of the common and civil law without
becoming mired in it. The contributions to this issue are an
important start.
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